Tag Archives: Molinism

Molinism and the Accidents of Salvation

Even if there is not a best of all logically possible worlds, I think the Molinist will want to insist that there is either a best of all logically feasible worlds (in light of which counterfactuals obtain) or a class … Continue reading

Posted in Apologetics, Molinism, Philosophical Theology, Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Theology | Tagged , , , | Leave a comment

Molinism and Sovereignty

The Christian who believes that God has middle knowledge is typically concerned to secure the belief that God is Sovereign in the sense that nothing whatever is out of God’s providential control and direction. God ordains what we will freely … Continue reading

Posted in Apologetics, Molinism, Philosophical Theology, Philosophy of Religion, Theology | Tagged , , | 4 Comments

Maximally Specific Synthetic Propositions

I have already argued that logically possible worlds ought not to be regarded as maximally consistent sets of propositions because it has been demonstrated that the ‘set of all true propositions‘ does not exist. Instead, therefore, we should speak about … Continue reading

Posted in Apologetics, Modality, Molinism, Philosophical Theology, Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Time, Theology | Tagged , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Deflationary theory of semantics and the PSR

The Principle of Sufficient Reason can be construed as the principle which states that for any fact having the property of being true or false (contingently), there is some corresponding reason which explains why the fact should have that property. … Continue reading

Posted in Apologetics, Free Will, Modality, Molinism, Theology | Tagged , , | Leave a comment

How some form of extreme modal realism might (not) ground molinist-type counterfactuals

Perhaps the idea of Molinist type counterfactuals could be aided by the ‘extreme modal realism’ theodicy which I have previously rhetorically appealed to. I am not attracted to extreme modal realism or anything like it, but let us suppose for … Continue reading

Posted in Free Will, Molinism, Philosophical Theology, Philosophy of Religion, Theology | Tagged , , , | Leave a comment

Scientia Visionis vs tensed omniscience

One of the objections to William Lane Craig’s suggestion that God is in time ‘since’ creation is that it violates both the immutability of God and the metaphysical simplicity of God, since God must learn tensed propositions over time, and … Continue reading

Posted in Apologetics, Epistemology, Modality, Molinism, Philosophy, Philosophy of Time, Theology | Tagged , , , , | Leave a comment

The world is a morally significant causal plenum

Supposing that the world is not a causal plenum, one might imagine that this or that cause does not have an infinite set of effects [alternatively: that the effect is not infinite] on the world. Thus Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle should not be … Continue reading

Posted in Apologetics, Causation, Ethics, Free Will, Molinism, Philosophy, Philosophy of Time, Theology | Tagged , , , | Leave a comment

Middle knowledge and Libertarian Free Will

It seems to me, upon reflection, that there may be a problem with presuming both that God has middle knowledge, and that we have free will in the libertarian sense. If we do have free will in the libertarian sense … Continue reading

Posted in Apologetics, Free Will, Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Theodicy, Theology | Tagged , , , | Leave a comment