Tag Archives: Critique of the Power of Judgment

Identifying Substances

Recently somebody challenged me to give an account for why I think things like cats are substances, and why rocks are not, after having agreed with me that we must admit there to be substances in the world in principle. … Continue reading

Posted in Epistemology, Metaphysics, Philosophy | Tagged , , , , , | Leave a comment

Maximally Specific Synthetic Propositions

I have already argued that logically possible worlds ought not to be regarded as maximally consistent sets of propositions because it has been demonstrated that the ‘set of all true propositions‘ does not exist. Instead, therefore, we should speak about … Continue reading

Posted in Apologetics, Modality, Molinism, Philosophical Theology, Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Time, Theology | Tagged , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Give Behaviourism to the Dogs

It seems to me that on the pragmatist theory of truth, which says basically that some belief is true if and only if it is useful given our intentions, one might be tempted to simply subscribe to a form of behaviourism … Continue reading

Posted in Animals, Apologetics, Epistemology, Philosophy, Theology | Tagged , , , , , | Leave a comment