# Tag Archives: A Theory

## The Difference between Physical and Temporal Antecedence

My purpose in this post is simple; I want to demonstrate that physical antecedence is not coextensive with temporal antecedence and vice versa. You can have one without the other. This reflection leads to a very weak argument against the … Continue reading

## A-theoretic time travel, B-theoretic time travel and Pruss

Pruss recently wrote an intriguing post on his blog where he argued that time travel might be possible on the A-theory. I used to disagree (and am not now sure), but I think his post can help clarify why time … Continue reading

## Temporal Corpuscularianism?

Suppose that we wanted to maintain that there are Chronons (an A-theorist might want to maintain as much). Now, suppose that we adopt a view according to which Chronons are all differently sized in just the same way that ancient … Continue reading

## If A-Theory is true, and there are no Chronons, then no two things are ‘at the same time’

The Present either has no duration, or it has duration. The Present has duration if and only if Chronons exist. Chronons do not exist. The Present has no duration. If the Present has no duration, then no two things can … Continue reading

## A-Theory and Infinite Worlds

If worlds are maximally consistent sets of propositions, and if A-theory is true, then propositions are all tensed. This seems to imply that the A-theory entails an actually infinite number of logically possible worlds being realized successively. This is because … Continue reading

## Events, Propositions, Infinities, and the Kalam Argument

Previously I had thought that there is no such thing as an infinite number of true propositions on the B-theory (nor is there on the A-theory), since there are an indefinite (not infinite) number of truths which can be derived … Continue reading

## Given A-theory, and Theism, could God travel backwards through time?

To travel backwards through time might mean something like, making what was past, present. On an A-theory, that would mean making what was robustly real in the past, but is no longer robustly real in the present, robustly real in … Continue reading