Category Archives: Philosophy of Science

Nomic Necessity and Ceteris Paribus

What philosophers of science and scientists want in scientific explanations is (generally) for there to be some law cited, some universally quantifiable regularity which holds with nomic necessity, an exception-less law. However, it seems to me that scientific laws are … Continue reading

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A Naturalistic Version of Intelligent Design

As some naturalistic biologists, and naturalists in other disciplines, have started to move away from the neo-Darwinian evolutionary view, and towards self-organization theory in biology as well as other alternatives, I thought I would just remind everybody that Intelligent Design … Continue reading

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Explanatory power, Scientific Realism, and Pragmatic anti-realism

McMullen argues in response to Kuhn that explanatory power ought to be considered among the virtues of a good explanation because explanatory power is a value which coincides with scientific realism. Somebody in class yesterday argued that perhaps there was … Continue reading

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Grandfather’s Quantum Time Machine?

I tried to suggest in a recent post that perhaps we can think of an example of something which logic precludes, and physics does not, and I gave the example of a time-travel based paradox called the Grandfather Paradox. Perhaps, … Continue reading

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Science and Schmience

I’ve been thinking about what kind of paper topic to pursue next semester in my intermediate philosophy of science class. I have been tempted to do something controversial, like pursuing issues raised by the debate over the legitimacy of the … Continue reading

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van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism

Bas van Fraassen is not your typical scientific anti-realist. Against the positivists, van Fraassen doesn’t want to admit that two different theories which predict all the same observations and experiences, are semantically equivalent, and thus he rejects the positivist construal … Continue reading

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