The issue of Molinism has continued to occupy much of my time in reflection of late, and I realized that all Christians do believe in at least one subjunctive counterfactual of libertarian free will, or at least nearly all Christians do.
If I had freely chosen to reject God, God would have freely chosen to allow me to damn myself.
There’s a non-actual (i.e., counter-factual) conditional, the consequent of which involves a non-actual libertarian free will decision. Other than the Calvinist (according to whom the antecedent is actually counter-possible), Christians of all stripes will agree with this object of middle knowledge. God knows what he would have freely chosen to do in non-actual circumstances.
What objections are there to this? Perhaps one could say that God’s decision to create a world at all entailed that he freely chose the consequent when he chose to allow for the possibility of the antecedent. Thus, this subjunctive counterfactual’s truth-maker is a factual conditional. I’ve already conceded that those kinds of subjunctive counterfactuals exist, which is to say that subjunctive counterfactuals whose truth-values supervene on contingent facts can exist. They clearly aren’t enough to get Molinism, as a view of God’s providence, off the ground, since subjunctive counterfactuals would be posterior to contingent factuals.
In a fight between Calvinism and Molinism, Molinism clearly wins, but Molinism is still so rife with problems that it screams out for something better. A more sophisticated view of God’s providence is required. It requires that not a single thing occur which violates God’s complete sovereignty over history in whole and in all its parts, that it allow truly categorical free will, that it not abandon the correspondence theory of truth, and so on. I’m convinced it can be done, in accord with Catholic doctrine, but it is certainly no small feat.