I argue that the reformed rejection of natural theology is best construed as an inchoate and unfocused rejection of classical foundationalism. What these Re-formed thinkers really mean to hold, I think, is that belief in God need not be based on argument or evidence from other propositions at all. They mean to hold that the believer is entirely within his intellectual rights in believing as he does even if he doesn’t know of any good theistic argument (deductive or inductive), even if he doesn’t believe that there is any such argument, and even if in fact no such argument exists.
I wonder if one can have a properly basic belief in God’s existence without there being in fact any argument, deductive or inductive, for the truth of Theism. What about the following argument:
- If a belief B is properly basic, then there’s a high probability that it is true if and only if most properly basic beliefs are true.
- Most Properly Basic beliefs are true.
- B is Properly Basic.
- Therefore, there is a high probability that B is true.
Wouldn’t the ‘Reformed Epistemologist’ be committed to that? Maybe not. Maybe it’s the case that the majority of our properly basic beliefs are false, and thus even if B is properly basic we just don’t have such an inductive argument for B just because it is properly basic. I suspect the Reformed-Epistemologist will be likely to respond that way, but I’m not sure.