In my previous post I argued that there may be a way to maintain justified belief in God’s existence, without any evidence, without maintaining that God’s existence is itself properly basic. If I’m right in principle, then that gives us two ways to maintain a rationally justified belief in God’s existence without any evidence for it. Here’s a third way:
Suppose that some properly basic belief S does not entail, but makes very probable, that G. If the probability is high enough for G, on S, so that P(G|S)>>P(~G|S), then one who has a justified belief in S can, it seems, form a justified belief in G. Notice that if S is properly basic then it is justified wholly apart from any evidence for it. Notice also that any argument for G’s being more probable on S does nothing to provide evidence for G. So, it looks like there’s a third way, in principle, to maintain a justified belief in God’s existence without any evidence for God’s existence.