Properly Basic Inferences

Recently I suggested that belief in God might be properly basic in two ways, either by being grounding in something like a sensus divinitatis, or by being entailed by some other properly basic belief. This is, in retrospect, obviously a mistake. Even if, by universal sanction, causal relations are properly basic, the PSR is properly basic, or any X is basic (where from X one can derive, by entailment or something closely analogous to entailment, that God exists), and those properly basic commitments also commit one to Theism, Theism must, it seems, be inferred from these other properly basic beliefs. But properly basic beliefs are beliefs which are not inferred. So, if one maintained their Theism merely because it could be inferred from such properly basic beliefs then they would not be able to maintain that Theism, strictly speaking, was, for them, properly basic.

About tylerjourneaux

I am an aspiring Catholic theologian and philosopher, and I have a keen interest in apologetics. I am creating this blog both in order to practice and improve my writing and memory retention as I publish my thoughts, and in order to give evidence of my ability to understand and communicate thoughts on topics pertinent to Theology, Philosophy, philosophical theology, Catholic (Christian) Apologetics, philosophy of religion and textual criticism.
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