I have been tempted in the past to construe the relation of physical possibility to logical possibility as injective (i.e., that all physical possibilities are logical possibilities) but that there are many more logical possibilities than there are physical possibilities (for instance, it is logically possible to go faster than the speed of light even if our best physics were to tell us that this isn’t possible, meaning ‘physically’ possible). However, maybe I’m wrong; maybe there are examples of things which are physically possible and which aren’t logically possible.
Here’s one example. I decide to take a time machine to travel back to when my Grandfather was being born, and kill him. Now, if one accepts the B-theory either on philosophical grounds, or even on the grounds that our best physics is B-theoretic (I’m more skeptical about this, but it could be argued), then this scenario would apparently be physically possible. However, contradictions do not arise in reality – but this is a constraint imposed by logical possibility. Thus, it is not logically possible that one killed one’s Grandfather before the time at which the Grandfather spread his seed. Physically there is no reason why it cannot happen (unless one gratuitously imports explicitly logical assumptions into physics). So, because of the kind of enterprise physics is, a theory of physics may make something which isn’t strictly logically possible physically possible.
Of course, we should say that anything which isn’t logically possible isn’t comprehensible as a hypothesis (a proposal about how the world could or might be) at all, and thereby argue that the suggestion is evacuated of meaning altogether, and so there’s no way for that suggestion to have the property of being physically possible.