A Presuppositional argument against “meaning incommensurability”

Here’s a thought: suppose somebody wants to argue that meaning is not public property, but in fact meaning is irreducibly subjective and arbitrated, such that the natural conclusion will be that meanings recognized by different persons are incommensurable. Such an argument leads to the conclusion that ideas are incommunicable; they aren’t the kinds of things we can share with one another. This provides, I think, an in-built defeater for such arguments. The argument’s conclusion, if correct, entails that the argument itself is incommunicable, and so to publish the argument in any medium is presumably to presume, at least, that it’s meaning is not incommensurable. This is a presuppositional argument against any argument whose conclusion is that meanings are not public property or truly communicable.

I also think, though I won’t write out the argument here, that the problem of meaning incommensurability can be solved on non-presuppositional grounds, the considerations of which may lead to the formulation of an argument for the existence of God.


About tylerjourneaux

I am an aspiring Catholic theologian and philosopher, and I have a keen interest in apologetics. I am creating this blog both in order to practice and improve my writing and memory retention as I publish my thoughts, and in order to give evidence of my ability to understand and communicate thoughts on topics pertinent to Theology, Philosophy, philosophical theology, Catholic (Christian) Apologetics, philosophy of religion and textual criticism.
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