There may be a concern that adopting the convention of talking of logically possible worlds as maximally specific propositions, each of which entail all truths at/in that logically possible world, seems to undermine libertarian freedom, since contingent choices are entailed by the fact that the world is this maximally specific proposition rather than that one. I think this is confused, but I also think I can help people see why.
Imagine that every different logically possible world can be represented by a different letter or symbol, so that one world is @ another is ß, and so on. Now if God knows a maximally specific proposition to be true (where a maximally specific proposition stands for a logically possible world) then what he knows is that, for instance, ß is true. That one truth is then apprehended by us partially (i.e., propositionally). It is easy to see how ß can entail contingent truths of the libertarian-free kind. It is the libertarian-free choices which gives the actual world the character of ß rather than @.