Maximally specific propositions and libertarian freedom

There may be a concern that adopting the convention of talking of logically possible worlds as maximally specific propositions, each of which entail all truths at/in that logically possible world, seems to undermine libertarian freedom, since contingent choices are entailed by the fact that the world is this maximally specific proposition rather than that one. I think this is confused, but I also think I can help people see why.

Imagine that every different logically possible world can be represented by a different letter or symbol, so that one world is @ another is ß, and so on. Now if God knows a maximally specific proposition to be true (where a maximally specific proposition stands for a logically possible world) then what he knows is that, for instance, ß is true. That one truth is then apprehended by us partially (i.e., propositionally). It is easy to see how ß can entail contingent truths of the libertarian-free kind. It is the libertarian-free choices which gives the actual world the character of ß rather than @.

Advertisements

About tylerjourneaux

I am an aspiring Catholic theologian and philosopher, and I have a keen interest in apologetics. I am creating this blog both in order to practice and improve my writing and memory retention as I publish my thoughts, and in order to give evidence of my ability to understand and communicate thoughts on topics pertinent to Theology, Philosophy, philosophical theology, Catholic (Christian) Apologetics, philosophy of religion and textual criticism.
This entry was posted in Logic, Metaphysics, Modality, Philosophy. Bookmark the permalink.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s