A Mormon Philosopher named Blake T. Ostler writes the following in response to a critique of the inadequacy of the Mormon conception of God given by Francis J. Beckwith and Stephen E. Parrish in their book The Mormon Concept of God: A Philosophical Analysis.
The authors argue that God can do anything, provided that (1) doing it is logically possible and (2) doing it is consistent with God’s basic attributes. However, even the authors cannot consistently adopt this notion of omnipotence. For example, God cannot bring about my free acts, although the fact that I bring about my free acts is (1) logically possible and (2) consistent with God’s attributes. Thus the authors’ notion of omnipotence is not adequate.
~The Mormon Concept of God: A Philosophical Analysis
I’d like to offer some thoughts. First of all, the second criterion proposed by Beckwith and Parrish just rehearses the first one, since it is not logically possible for God to act contrary to his basic attributes, precisely because they are not contingent, but logically necessary (God could not himself have been otherwise than he is). For instance, there is no logically possible world where God could cause himself to cease to exist, precisely because God’s essence involves existence. His essence is identical in all logically possible worlds at/in which he exists (which, for a Theist, is all of them).
Concerning my free acts – God cannot ‘do’ them precisely because they are not God’s acts at all. This is just a grammatical-semantic confusion. God is not properly the nominative noun in the sentence with the verb ‘to do’ in such cases as are to be brought up. Notice how slippery the language of the argument is, it begins with God ‘doing’, and ends with an objection about God not ‘bringing about’. God cannot do something which can only be done by some being other than God, such as a decision which some moral agency with categorical free will has to freely make.
However, God can certainly bring it about that I act freely (for instance by creating me as a libertarian-free creature), though he cannot bring it about which way I will freely act (unless subjunctive counterfactuals of creaturely freedom have truth values, which I believe they do not), except perhaps by ensuring that in all the nearest possible worlds, given the counterfactuals at those worlds, I will most likely freely act in such-and-such a way.
Though it remains logically possible for me to freely act in X way, it is not logically possible for God to make me freely act in X way. God can bring it about that I act freely in X way by being part of the whole causal story for my acting in X way. God can do anything which is logically possible. Objections such as “well, a world of free creatures all of whom always freely choose not to sin is logically possible, so why couldn’t God do that?” fail entirely to understand that such a thing is not something God can do because it isn’t something God can do. It is no objection to the claim that God can do all of that which is logically possible [where he is the do-er].
This objection, as most others, seems to come down to a linguistic confusion.