Previously I had thought that there is no such thing as an infinite number of true propositions on the B-theory (nor is there on the A-theory), since there are an indefinite (not infinite) number of truths which can be derived from the truth represented as a maximally specific true proposition. I have, however, thought that perhaps on B-theory there would still need to be an actually (not potentially) infinite number of events in time. However, what if there is an analogy between propositions and events? Suppose that we accept that a proposition represent useful façon de parler insofar as it represents some part of the truth to us, but does not represent in itself some discrete truth. We should say that propositions are the only ways we have of representing the truth to ourselves piecemeal, since our minds cannot at once apprehend the whole truth (due to the constitution of our cognitive faculties). Propositions do not exist as discrete things each having the property of being either true or false. Why can’t we say the very same thing about events? If no such things as chronons (atoms of time) exist, then why not say that we simply represent the world’s chrono-logy to ourselves in our minds by dividing it into successive events. However, across any set of events in time, we could divine time into an actually infinite number of events if events are just slices of time (and if there are not chronons).
So, on B-theory, there are not actually an infinite number of events, there is only one world-event, which we represent to ourselves by dividing it into discrete representations we call ‘events’. Moreover, the fact that the world is actually infinite in the sense that the world-event is without end and is actual, is not a problem if I am right in saying that no absurdity arises from postulating a simple (non-composite) actual infinite, rather than a composite actual infinite (comprised of discrete parts).
So, if events are not actually discrete things which compose an actual infinite, and are instead derived, for the sake of our reason, from one single simple actual infinite chrono-logy,
then the B-theorist can help herself to the Kalam cosmological argument for the existence of God (Bonaventure was right and Aquinas wrong). [Edit: I thought this could be done by appealing to the impossibility of an actually infinite number of entities, but that thought obviously is not without controversy. I was wrong to leap. In any case though, the B-theorist can accept the argument from the impossibility of an actual infinite for the second premise of the Kalam argument presented by Craig.]
In other words, just as there is no actually infinite number of tue propositions, but only an indefinite number of true propositions, so also there is no actually infinite number of actual events, but only an indefinite number of actual events.