A-Theory and Infinite Worlds

If worlds are maximally consistent sets of propositions, and if A-theory is true, then propositions are all tensed. This seems to imply that the A-theory entails an actually infinite number of logically possible worlds being realized successively. This is because any given moment/event represents a discrete logically possible world. Moreover, for any duration of time there are infinitely many intervals of time (if and only if chronons do not exist), and any interval of time is logically possibly identified with an ‘event’.

If worlds are maximally specific propositions, then A-theory still implies that every moment must correspond to a discrete logically possible world, since propositions are objectively tensed.

I suppose the A-theorist will argue that no interval of time instantiates an actually infinite number of logically possible worlds, but I think it must so long as what I said about events is true. Alternatively the A-theorist will argue that there are an indefinite number of events, instead of an infinite number of events (as I just argued in the previous post could be said). Remember though that every instant of time represents different logically possible worlds, and so for any duration of time, an actually infinite number of logically possible worlds have come to exist.

This undercuts one popularly cited argument for preferring the A-theory to the B-theory.


About tylerjourneaux

I am an aspiring Catholic theologian and philosopher, and I have a keen interest in apologetics. I am creating this blog both in order to practice and improve my writing and memory retention as I publish my thoughts, and in order to give evidence of my ability to understand and communicate thoughts on topics pertinent to Theology, Philosophy, philosophical theology, Catholic (Christian) Apologetics, philosophy of religion and textual criticism.
This entry was posted in Apologetics, Philosophical Theology, Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Time and tagged , . Bookmark the permalink.

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