I (problematically) maintain the following:
- Christianity ⊃ Catholicism
- Catholicism ⊃ B Theory
- B Theory ⊃ Actual Infinity
The problem is that along with maintaining 1-4, I also maintain:
5. ~Actual Infinity
I maintain 5 due in large part to arguments such as those presented by William Lane Craig, in his Kalam Cosmological argument. The reason the B-theory of time implies an Actually Infinite number of things, it seems, is that B-theory implies that there are infinitely many true propositions about the future given that, even with the end of our world, Christianity has a commitment to an eschatological end of everlasting heaven. However, if heaven is everlasting, then it seems there would be infinitely many true propositions about the future in heaven, since it is literally without end.
However, if we accept that propositions aren’t real things, as I have become convinced, then it seems that there are not infinitely many propositions. However, there would still be, it seems to me, infinitely many events in the future which, according to the B theory, are as real as is the present event, or any and all events in the past. If one denies that events are ‘real things’ then it seems that one also loses the Kalam cosmological argument.
Also, doesn’t it seem logically possible that God could create an infinite number of concrete real things? Of course, I suppose that depends on whether one thinks the notion of an actual infinite is coherent. If the notion of an actually infinite number of things is not coherent, it isn’t logically possible, and thus God can’t do it precisely because ‘it’ isn’t anything (it isn’t intelligible, therefore to say God could do it is equally unintelligible, and to say God could not do it would be unintelligible as well).